Conflict and Peacemaking

Conflict

Social dilemmas
The prisoner’s dilemma
Resolving social dilemmas

Tit for Tat

Begins with a cooperative opening play and then always matches the other player’s last response

First, it pays to be "nice."
Second, a successful strategy is "provocable."
Third, a successful strategy is "forgiving."

Conflict

Competition
Perceived injustice

Misperception

Mirror-image perceptions
We are good, you are bad
Shifting perceptions
Japanese after World War II
Exaggerating the Other’s Position

 

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both sides assume that the difference between the two sides’ attitudes is one and one half to four times greater than is the actual difference

Pruitt and Rubin (1986): Conflict Strategies and the Dual Concern Model

Hypothetical case of Peter Colger who has been looking forward to a two-week vacation at a quiet mountain lodge. His wife, Mary, however, has expressed her preference for a busy seaside resort
contending, that is, arguing for the merits of a mountain vacation, even threatening to go alone if Mary does not agree
problem-solving approach and attempt to find a vacation spot that satisfies both sets of interests
yield to Mary’s preference and go to the seashore
inactive (do nothing) in the hope that their disagreement will go away

withdraw from the controversy by deciding not to take any vacation.

Peacemaking

Contact
When does desegregation improve racial attitudes?
Friendship
Equal status contact

Cooperation

Common external threats
Superordinate goals
Cooperative learning
Generalizing positive attitudes
Group and superordinate identities

Sherif’s Summer Camp Study

Competition between two groups of boy campers escalated
Superordinate goal of restoring water to make enemies into friends
Remember this at church camp!

Threats and Cooperation

Shomer, Davis, & Kelley, 1966 - under certain limited conditions threat may promote cooperation
When threat is the only form of communication possible, and when it can signal one’s intent without actually producing a negative outcome for the opposing party, it may facilitate cooperation
In most cases, however, threat increases rather than decreases tension

Peacemaking

Communication
Bargaining
Mediation
Arbitration

Conciliation

GRIT
Graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction
To de-escalate international tensions

Max Bazerman: Negotiation

Expanding the fixed pie
Dehexing the winner’s curse
Get a mechanic’s evaluation
De-escalating conflict
Undercutting overconfidence
Reframing negotiations

Rubin’s (1981) Psychological Traps

Set limits on your involvement and commitment.
Once the limit has been set, stick to it.
Do not look to other people to see what you should do.
Be conscious of your desire to impress others.
Remind yourself of the costs involved.
Remain vigilant. Avoiding one trap does not guarantee you will successfully avoid the next.