“Scrutinizing a Scandal:
A Christian Worldview Analysis of a Christian College Professor Who Flunks
Christian Worldview Tests and Doesn’t Teach from a Christian Worldview”
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Jack Heller’s articles in the last two editions of The New Pantagruel — “Christian College Professor Flunks Christian Worldview Tests” and “Further Scandal: Christian College Professor Doesn’t Teach from a Christian Worldview” — offer formidable challenges to the “worldview tradition” in evangelical Christianity. As a Christian and a professor of philosophy at Dallas Baptist University, I have had a long-term interest in all things “worldview,” and have recently written a book on the history of the concept. My interest in this discussion grows out of this background and will form the basis of my remarks. In short, while I agree with Prof. Heller’s critiques of the so-called “worldview tests” administered by the Nehemiah Institute and by the Worldview Weekend para-church ministry (these groups do, in fact, make positive contributions otherwise), I have serious concerns about his arguments in the second essay on teaching from a Christian worldview. In this response, I will comment rather briefly about the former issue, and offer more extensive remarks on this latter concern, in an attempt to speak the truth, as I see it, in love.

I first learned about the “free online worldview test” administered by Worldview Weekend through a Yahoo discussion group comprised of past and present
students of mine who were/are members of the Pew/Paideia College Society, an academic organization for intellectually gifted students at Dallas Baptist. I logged on in anticipation of finding a helpful method for worldview analysis. But after reading and answering just a few questions, I became frustrated with their content and orientation, and never finished the exam. Several of my students, and even a faculty member or two who completed the test, failed it, just as Prof. Heller did. The rather jocular follow-up discussion about our experiences with this assessment tool resembled Prof. Heller’s own summary of its shortcomings: “limited subject matter, limited test result possibilities, problematic historical statements, and questionable theology and biblical interpretation.” All of us were less than impressed with this approach to measuring worldview commitment, and we were concerned about its impact. However, none of us went away from it eschewing the value of the precious concept of a biblical worldview and its significant role in the Church, in Christian life and mission, and in institutions of Christian education. None of us concluded that the abuse of the concept barred its proper use, anymore than, say, occasional medical malpractice undermines the generally good work of hospitals. If anything, this experience prompted internal resolve, at least on my part, to develop and apply a Christian Weltanschauung with a greater degree of Spirit-bred humility, prudence, and maturity. If Prof. Heller is inclined otherwise, I hope he will reconsider.

In my attempt to read Prof. Heller’s second article carefully, I perceive that he is concerned about six important issues related to the matter of Christian worldview: (1) the lack of specificity about “what it means to teach from a Christian worldview”; (2) the lack of specificity regarding the content of “a distinctively Christian worldview”; (3) the diversity of definitions of the very concept of “worldview” itself; (4) the lack of reflection regarding the various forces that shape a person’s worldview, especially a Christian one; (5) the imposition of a reductive “Mere Christianity’ worldviewism” on writers as culturally diverse as the Beowulf poet and Flannery O’Connor; and (6) the proposal of Debora Shuger’s notion of “habits of thought” as an alternative to worldview. These items contain some valid points, and also call for pertinent criticisms.

The lack of specificity about “what it means to teach from a Christian worldview.”

Because of his institutional address at Huntington College, students, parents and administrators rightly assume that Prof. Heller teaches from a Christian worldview. After all, Huntington is “an evangelical Christian college of the liberal arts,”3 and is also a member of the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities which promotes Christian worldview development as a chief goal of its allied institutions.

But what does teaching from a Christian worldview mean? Prof. Heller’s concern is pedagogical in nature, about how to teach maturely from a given slant — in this case, a Christian one. This legitimate question may arise because of the
dubious manner in which teaching from a Christian worldview is sometimes undertaken. Should Christian professors simply seek to critique literary texts from a doctrinal perspective to see if they match up? Prof. Heller asks in regard to Edith Wharton’s novella *Ethan Frome*: are his goals (1) to identify the unacceptable naturalistic worldview and the accompanying immorality of the chief character, (2) to contrast this with Christian belief in order to reject the former and embrace the latter, all leading (3) to a rejection of the ethos and issues of Wharton’s novella because of its worldview orientation? For Heller, this kind of “worldview criticism” depends on “facile labeling” (that is, on cheap worldview identifications), and the text itself and its artistry become an excuse for “amateur philosophizing” (that is, for cheap apologetics). Instead of this balderdash, Prof. Heller asserts that his method is to respect and discuss the “fictional world” present in the text, and let the students themselves analyze its validity.

I agree with this assessment. All too often, worldview advocates, despite good intentions, fail to treat texts and other artifacts with the integrity they deserve. All too often they rush to worldview judgments that short circuit a fuller hermeneutic and critical process. There is much more to say about human *poiesis* than its worldview origin, content, or impact.

Despite the legitimacy of this criticism, however, at least two things must be said in response. First, while worldview criticism might be one-dimensional and pursued rather frantically out of religious or apologetic interests, this does not make it an illegitimate aspect of critical analysis. Indeed, it was a significant component to G. W. F. Hegel’s own aesthetic philosophy. Nonetheless, this approach does need to be supplemented with other forms of interpretation and analysis in order to provide a more complete understanding of the work under consideration. On the other hand, simply to let a text speak for itself and allow students to process the moral world it creates, as Prof. Heller proposes, seems deficient and unwise. Impressionable students need the hermeneutic and philosophic guidance of seasoned Christian professors to help them understand and critique texts and their implications, recognizing the power of stories (and other objets d’art) to shape consciousness and conscience for better or for worse.

Second, though Prof. Heller fails to acknowledge this, a considerable amount of intelligent work has already been done on the subject of faith-discipline integration that relates a Christian worldview to academic enterprises in sophisticated ways. One resource among many is a book titled *The Reality of Christian Learning: Strategies for Faith-Discipline Integration*, edited by Harold Heie and David L. Wolfe. It spells out a clear line of demarcation between integration and pseudo-integration, articulates the role of substantive and methodological presuppositions, value commitments, and systematic schemata (worldviews) in scholarly endeavors, and explains and illustrates compatibilist, reconstructionist, and transformational integrative strategies across the academic
disciplines. The approaches detailed in this volume are considerably more advanced than the rather superficial approaches of the various ministries with which Prof. Heller seems to be preoccupied. To be sure, more work needs to be done in this area, and individual scholars and particular institutions can certainly improve the depth and quality of their worldview-based educational efforts. Much of Christian scholarship is still at an adolescent stage of development. To suggest, however, that there is a lack of specificity in the available literature about what it means to teach from a Christian worldview is simply false.

Be that as it may, Prof. Heller still has trouble accepting commonplace descriptions of the tasks of Christian professors who are supposed to teach from a Christian worldview. For example, he is befuddled by Claude O. Pressnell's way of articulating the task of Christian scholars that includes a reference to the deleterious effects of the fallen human intellect and a call for intimacy with Christ as an academic prerequisite. If the intellect is fallen, and Heller believes that it is, then how is it at all possible to have confidence in a Christian worldview? Furthermore, what does intimacy with Christ have to do with capable teaching, say of Shakespeare or Wharton?

In response to these two concerns, let us remind ourselves, first of all, that the reason why it is possible to have epistemic confidence in a Christian view of the world is because the created though fallen human intellect has been redeemed and renewed in Jesus Christ. The noetic effects of sin are adequately, though not perfectly, reversed through the noetic effects of eschatological redemption which is “already” but “not yet.” In place of a previous ignorance and foolishness, believers are given the gift of the mind of Christ along with the significant task of developing this new spiritual and cognitive “sense” (Jonathan Edwards) based on the Spirit-taught Word of God. Obedient disciples of Christ graciously know revealed truth, which is not only soteriological but also cosmological in scope, and it is this all-embracing truth that sets them free. Christian conversion and sanctification, then, have profound implications on the effective operation of the human mind. As Bernard Lonergan states, “It directs a person’s gaze, pervades his imagination, releases the symbols that penetrate to the depths of his psyche. It enriches his understanding, guides his judgments, reinforces his decisions.”

Prof. Heller’s worldview agnosticism, therefore, is biblically unwarranted and contrary to the epistemic implications of the Christian gospel.

Second, in contrast to Prof. Heller’s embrace of a modern anthropological dualism that separates will from intellect and allows for a division between a scholar’s moral condition (values, faith, private life) and cognitive function (facts, reason, public life), a biblical anthropology rooted in the Hebraic concept of the *imago Dei* is holistic in character, and ties together ethics and epistemology. Who we are in character and conduct affects what we know and how we teach, for as Jesus states, “the mouth speaks out that which fills the heart.” Significant voices in the Christian intellectual tradition substantiate this integrated vision of the faculties of the human person and the ethics-epistemology nexus. In Augustine’s
terms, “Now whosoever supposes that he can know truth while he is still living iniquitously is in error” (De Agone Christiano).7 Or as Thomas Aquinas states, “unchastity’s first-born daughter is blindness of spirit.”8 And as contemporary Maritain scholar Ralph McInerny argues, “The virtuous life is a necessary … condition for the successful theoretical use of the mind.”9 Thus Prof. Heller’s Enlightenment-based fact/value dichotomy is contrary to the holism of a biblical anthropology and is rebuffed by leading thinkers in the Christian tradition. Intimacy with Christ, that is, a scholar’s spiritual and moral condition, has much to do with teaching and impacts academic output.

The lack of specificity regarding the content of “a distinctively Christian worldview.”

Not only is Prof. Heller flummoxed by the lack of specificity regarding Christian worldview pedagogy, but he also registers complaint about the lack of clarity regarding Christian worldview content. Claude Pressnell’s comments are again disappointing for Heller because he “evades a question that his description of the Christian scholar’s task begs to have answered: What does he mean by ‘a distinctively Christian worldview’?”

There is a Catch-22, however. On the one hand, if the notion remains substantially undefined, it is amorphous and presumably unhelpful. On the other hand, if its content is clarified significantly, the discussion changes from Christian worldview pluralism (“a”) to Christian worldview exclusivism (“the”), and the specific worldview formulation becomes subject to a plethora of sociological, historical, and theological criticisms. According to Heller, worldview thinkers are damned if they do and damned if they don’t. But sooner or later what is excluded and included in the notion must be spelled out. All that Prof. Heller is able to marshal from his sources on this matter are the exclusion of anything that undermines a modernist, objectivist version of truth (so David Dockery), and the inclusion of objective moral standards rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition (so the Nehemiah Institute and Worldview Weekend). But, Heller concludes, if the gaps aren’t filled in and “if that’s all there is” (apologies to Peggy Lee) to a Christian worldview, then the concept is left open to political aggrandizement by conservative Christians.

But Prof. Heller surely knows that others have certainly filled in the gaps regarding biblical worldview content — David Dockery does in his other writings10 — and there is much more to it than what he is admitting. A number of Protestant Evangelical, Roman Catholic, and Eastern Orthodox writers have spelled out the essentials of the Christian vision, and among them there is a rather amazing consensus.11 The basic elements of the narrative of Scripture — namely God the Father’s creation of very good world that subsequently falls into sin because of a primeval human rebellion whose comprehensive effects are overcome by the fulfillment of a plan of salvation through the incarnation of the Son of God who provides a cosmic redemption that renews all things through the
Spirit-empowered Church and will be consummated at Christ’s second advent in
the establishment of the new heavens and earth — forms the specific content of
the Christian worldview. These worldview “pillar points,” as I like to call them,
have constituted classic Christian orthodoxy, found embodiment in historic
statements of faith, provided the framework for the theological reflections of the
leading doctors of the Church, and supplied the meaningful context for the lives
and service of the saints and martyrs throughout the ages. To be sure, detailed
interpretations of these basic worldview themes have varied from tradition to
tradition. This is why it is important to refer to “a” rather than “the” Christian
worldview. But this Christian worldview pluralism — Catholic, Orthodox,
Evangelical — should be regarded as a cross-pollinating source of enrichment
for the worldview tradition in which one stands, rather than as the root of a
nascent liberalism or an unhealthy Christian elasticity, as Prof. Heller claims. At
least, that is the way it has worked for me and others I know. Nonetheless, if this
much of biblical faith is clear — creation, fall, salvation history, incarnation,
redemption, church, consummation — then is there any real reason for Prof.
Heller to complain about a lack of understanding what constitutes a distinctive
Christian worldview? 12

The diversity of definitions of the very concept of “worldview” itself.

Prof. Heller is also dismayed over the lack of an exact definition of the worldview
concept itself. When he asks, “What really goes into the composition of one’s
worldview?” he cites three alternative definitions of the term, including my own.
But for the most part, he comes away from the discussion dissatisfied by the
notion’s apparent elasticity and asks: “Is it helpful?” Prof. Heller obviously intends
a negative response to his question.

Now if a definition of “worldview” as a concept is what Prof. Heller is concerned
about, then a basic dictionary definition like “a comprehensive interpretation or
image of the universe and humanity” (Encarta) should suffice to get the essential
point of the word across. That said, a couple of additional points need to be
made here. First, the fact that a lengthy and rather vibrant discussion persists
among worldview theorists who seek to put finer points on the definition of the
term suggests that “worldview” is a crucial idea worthy of extensive discussion
and refinement. After all, other concepts in the history of thought have also been
the subject of intense scrutiny and undergone significant development. Shouldn’t
the same linguistic grace we grant to the genealogy of other ideas be extended
to “worldview” as well?

Second, it is important to recognize the sociological relativity of worldview
theorizing and definitions. The recent post-Enlightenment re-humanization of the
intellectual process shows that it is not feasible for anyone to approach any topic
apart from the conditioning presence of a worldview. There simply is no impartial
ground upon which to stand when attempting to develop a thesis about any
concept, including this one. Worldview definitions are not the result of
presuppositionless thinking, but reflect the perspectives and interests of their originators. Therefore, what a person understands a worldview to be is, interestingly enough, dependent upon that person’s worldview!

For this reason, I devoted chapter nine in my book to unpacking the implications of biblical faith on the concept of worldview, and James Sire has recently done something similar in his new work titled Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept.13 Ironically, then, a little worldview savvy on Prof. Heller’s part would enable him to understand the reasons for the elasticity of worldview definitions and why they differ.

The lack of reflection regarding the various forces that shape a person’s worldview, especially a Christian one.

Prof. Heller also faults the evangelical worldview tradition for its failure to think carefully about the “specific confluence of influences that go into [forming] a Christian worldview.” He wants to know, for example, how a person’s mental, emotional, and behavioral processes shape a worldview, and which, in fact, comes first — a person’s psychological state, or a person’s worldview? I appreciate the fact that Prof. Heller credits me with anticipating the importance of these matters in my own work through my considerations of the worldview concept, not only in philosophy and theology, but also in the social sciences — psychology, anthropology, and sociology. There may very well be hints in my analyses of various thinkers in these disciplines about how worldviews are formed. In this regard, Michael Kearney’s discussion about worldview formation from the Marxist vantage point of cultural materialism vis-à-vis cultural idealism is especially helpful.14 How the liturgy of the church is influential in the process of worldview formation is a project I am currently exploring. In any case, Prof. Heller’s criticisms (or observations) at this level do not damage the notion of worldview per se, or its utility. They merely suggest that there may be a need for more work to be done in regard to factors influencing worldview formation.

The imposition of a reductionistic “‘Mere Christianity’ worldviewism” on writers as culturally diverse as the Beowulf poet and Flannery O’Connor.

I see this as the crux of the matter for Prof. Heller, even though it is a sub-specie of the first of the six issues he raises in his article, namely “what does it mean to teach from a Christian worldview?” Prof. Heller is justified in asking whether or not the notion of a Christian worldview is capable of uniting “such historically, culturally diverse writers” as the Beowulf poet all the way up to Flannery O’Connor (if each of these were Christians, then presumably they had some kind of Christian view of reality). He is rightly concerned about the possible imposition of a rather rigid, “one-size-fits-all” interpretation of the Christian faith upon a diversity of authors in the Western canon that would cloud their idiosyncrasies and other important aspects of their lives, transform them into contemporary evangelicals, and reduce intelligent criticism to an enforced “‘Mere Christianity’
worldviewism.” Undoubtedly, some educators “armed” with a Christian worldview employ this strategy. But for Heller, it is woefully monochromatic and too definitive for his taste. Mine too.

Once again, however, a question must be raised: Is this a liability of the Christian worldview concept per se? Does a Christian worldview in and of itself demand this kind of teaching? Or is this not the fault of a faulty worldview pedagogy that is rather unsophisticated in technique, and/or employed with too much apologetic zeal?

While Prof. Heller may assert that the trouble is inherent in the “abstracted and naïve certainty of a worldview” itself, the history of the concept shows that it actually embodied relativistic connotations as the product of German idealism and romanticism. For this reason, both Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger contrasted the subjectivist character of worldviews with their respective scientific philosophies, arguing that the former supplies its advocates with values, while the latter is the source of unadulterated facts. The modern scientific attitude, not the phenomenon of worldview as such, is the source of epistemic stridency along with its prejudiced pedagogical consequences. Hence, the solution to the “worldview problem” is not to be found in its dismissal, but in an overhaul of what it means to know and teach.15

The proposal of Debora Shuger’s notion of “habits of thought” as an alternative to worldview.

Since Prof. Heller believes that “worldview” is a product of the German Enlightenment that brings with it “the secularizing insistence that the search for truth can terminate on proper positions and principles,” he proposes Debora Shuger’s more relaxed expression “habits of thought” as a useful substitute. This notion suggests that individuals and societies organize their thinking around certain dominant tropes or various rhetorical and figurative devices. By avoiding the alleged dogmatism fostered by worldview, it is a good way to convey, say, the rough-and-ready mindset of the English Renaissance and the tentative attitude of St. Paul toward his own belief system. The notion of “habits of thought” is intuitively impressive for Prof. Heller, fits his own experience, and squares with biblical injunctions to examine one’s way of thinking. Hence, he believes it is best to equip students with mature “habits of thought” rather than burden them with the abstracted, naïve certainty of a worldview.

I have no grouse against the notion of “habits of thought” per se, and I can see it being used nicely as a stylistic alternative to “worldview” in appropriate contexts. It also reminds me of the lovely phrase — “the well-worn grooves of thought” — used by C. S. Lewis in his poem “In Praise of Solid People.”16 When compared, one wonders just how much real lexical difference there is between “worldview” and “habits of thought.” Nevertheless, the way Prof. Heller recommends this expression manifests a possible weakness.17 In his concern to avoid what for
him is the unattractive certitude associated with the evangelical worldview tradition, Heller’s term "habits of thought" seems to convey the opposite nuances of uncertainty and perhaps a little bit of skepticism. Just how much uncertainty and skepticism he wants to pour into “habits of thought” is the crucial question. When he claims that St. Paul’s “habits of thought” caused him to think rather poorly of his current view of the world based on 1 Cor. 13:12, it seems that he attributes quite a bit of epistemic slippage to the notion.18 If so, we might ask if Heller resides in the epistemic camp of the postmodernists? A responsible position like that of critical realism acknowledges the imperfections of human knowledge and the need for correction to be sure, but without capitulating to skepticism or relativism or anti-realism. Truth exists and is knowable, but sometimes we fall short, and need help in order to move closer to the truth. If this is what Prof. Heller wishes to communicate through the “habits of thought” concept, well and good. If not, then we have a problem from the vantage point of Christian conviction. He would serve himself and his readers well if he would articulate more clearly the epistemic position he intends to communicate by his use of this expression.

Conclusion:

Overall, I believe that Prof. Heller’s protest against the evangelical worldview tradition is in some sense a straw man argument. Howard Kahane and Nancy Cavender say this fallacy is committed when “we misrepresent an opponent’s position … and go after a weaker opponent or competitor while ignoring a stronger one.”19 Now I don’t think that Prof. Heller has misrepresented his opponent’s position — his descriptions of certain evangelical worldview ministries are fair, accurate and even helpful — but I do think he has gone after a weaker opponent and ignored a stronger one. The stronger one he has ignored is the vibrant, mature, sophisticated, and historic worldview tradition represented by the likes of James Orr, Abraham Kuyper, Herman Dooyeweerd, Gordon Clark, Carl F. H. Henry, Francis A. Schaeffer, Alexander Schmemann, Arthur Holmes, James Sire, Brian Walsh, Richard Middleton, James Olthius, Albert Wolters, Charles Colson, Nancy Pearcey, Os Guinness, Michael Wittmer, and dare I say it, even myself. Would the specific critiques that Prof. Heller levels at the Nehemiah Institute and Worldview Weekend hold water in this company? Unlikely. Wouldn’t this rather distinguished group of thinkers have decent responses to the majority of Prof. Heller’s worldview concerns? More than likely. Until Prof. Heller also interacts with this larger constituency about the questions at hand, then the only scandal that remains is the scandal of debunking the invaluable notion of a Christian worldview and its crucial role in promoting the kingdom of God and His glory.

Notes

1. David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002). For information:
http://www.eerdmans.com/shop/product.asp?p_key=0802847617. For personal and professional information, and a variety of lectures, papers and other resources, see www.dbu.edu/naugle.

2. For information on the Pew/Paideia College Society at DBU, see http://www.dbu.edu/naugle/paideia.htm.


13. James W. Sire, *Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004). In this new work, Sire builds upon his previous understanding of the term and adds some new insights as well, resulting in this new, updated definition: “A worldview is a commitment, a fundamental orientation of the human heart, that can be expressed as a story or in a set of presuppositions (assumptions which may be true, partially true or entirely false) which we hold (consciously or subconsciously, consistently or inconsistently) about the basic constitution of reality, and that provides the foundation on which we live, move and have our being” (p. 122).


17. Here is an additional critique worth pondering: what is to prevent “habits of thought” from calcifying and taking on the ideological connotations that Heller
earnestly seeks to avoid in worldview? Fascist “habits of thought” and “Fascist worldview” convey the same meaning for all practical purposes, so the former expression fails to secure any real advantage over the latter. The problems that Heller ascribes to “worldview” could also afflict his notion of “habits of thought.”

18. This assertion, I contend, is based on a misreading of 1 Cor. 13: 12 and the tension created by the “already/not yet” framework of eschatological redemption.


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